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Key Points Summary 
 
§ The form of information representation in the brain, whether continuous or discrete, is 
a contentious physiological research question, with an overwhelming majority of 
contemporary neuroscientists defaulting to the continuous form. 
§ It is a fact that information (e.g. human vision) must be transmitted over a relatively 
vast distance (via the optic nerve to the visual cortex) in the presence of noise  (e.g. 
thermal noise, conduction loss, neurobiological imperfections) while preserving its 
fidelity. 
§ Shannon’s communications theory posits that continuous representation of information 
in the brain is not plausible under noisy conditions; it has to be in discrete form. 
§ We test this discrete hypothesis using a computer simulation of neuronal 
communications, a human behavioral experiment on probability estimation and a 
human behavioral experiment on intertemporal choices. 
§ Our extensive results strongly support the discrete hypothesis, implying the need to 
revisit fundamental assumptions on the brain’s physiology. 
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Abstract 
 
The question of continuous-versus-discrete information representation in the brain 
is a fundamental yet unresolved physiological question. Historically, most analyses assume 
a continuous representation without considering the alternative possibility of a discrete 
representation. Our work explores the plausibility of both representations, and answers the 
question from a communications engineering perspective. Drawing on the well-established 
Shannon’s communications theory, we posit that information in the brain is represented in 
a discrete form. Using a computer simulation, we show that information cannot be 
communicated reliably between neurons using a continuous representation, due to the 
presence of noise; neural information has to be in a discrete form. In addition, we designed 
3 (human) behavioral experiments on probability estimation and analyzed the data using a 
novel discrete (quantized) model of probability. Under a discrete model of probability, two 
distinct probabilities (say, 0.57 and 0.58) are treated indifferently. We found that data from 
all participants were better fit to discrete models than continuous ones. Furthermore, we re-
analyzed the data from a published (human) behavioral study on intertemporal choice 
using a novel discrete (quantized) model of intertemporal choice. Under such a model, two 
distinct time delays (say, 16 days and 17 days) are treated indifferently. We found 
corroborating results, showing that data from all participants were better fit to discrete 
models than continuous ones. In summary, all results reported here support our discrete 
hypothesis of information representation in the brain, which signifies a major demarcation 
from the current understanding of the brain’s physiology. 
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Introduction 
 
 Music is composed of continuous vibrations of sound waves. These waves can be 
recorded (or stored) in either continuous (e.g. cassette tape, LP record) or discrete (e.g. CD, 
MP3) form. This equivalence leads to a fundamental research question in neuroscience, 
namely, is information in the brain represented in continuous or discrete form? To clarify, 
there is no doubt that neural signals (electrical waveforms) are continuous-valued (e.g. a 
typical cell membrane voltage potential can take any value between -40 mV and -70 mV); 
the question is then whether the information embedded within (or carried by) these neural 
signals is continuous or discrete. A helpful analogy here is the Morse Code, where 
information is clearly discrete (i.e. dots or dashes) but the electrical (or radio) signals that 
carry this discrete information are continuous. While this neural information representation 
question may appear to be trivial, it remains unresolved. McCulloch and Pitts (1943) 
theorized that computation in the brain is digital (i.e. discrete), whereas Lashley (1960) 
suggested that “the brain is an analogical machine, not digital”. More recently, 
VanRullen and Koch (2003) highlighted that a discrete representation of conscious 
perception (in the brain) is often “considered but never widely accepted”. At the same 
time, a continuous representation “cannot satisfactorily account for a large body of 
psychophysical data”. In the visual working memory literature, this continuous-versus-
discrete debate is currently at an impasse – an extensive review of arguments for and 
against both positions can be found in Luck and Vogel (2013), and Ma et al. (2014). 
Perhaps the problem is best summed up by Gallistel (2016): “We do not yet know in what 
abstract form (analog or digital) the mind stores the basic numerical quantities that give 
substance to the foundational abstractions, the information acquired from evidence.” [We 
note here that our use of the term representation encompasses a broad range of information 
processing activities (or functions) in the brain, including thinking (performing 
computations, decision-making) and remembering (forming and recollecting memories). 
Furthermore, in the present work, the terms continuous and analog are treated as equivalent 
in an engineering sense, as are the terms discrete and digital.]  
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 In the absence of a clear resolution to this debate, a continuous representation (of 
information in the brain) is almost always the de facto position when considering models 
and theories arising from experimental data. This is, in part, due to the appeal of the 
mathematical elegance and analytical convenience of continuous representations (or Real 
numbers). For example, in Abbott, DePasquale and Memmesheimer (2016), the authors 
pointed out that neurons communicate with one another “almost exclusively through 
discrete action potentials” – yet, the models described in the rest of the paper employ 
continuous representation (derivative calculus using Real numbers). Similarly, in 
Chaudhuri and Fiete (2016), discrete attractor models were lauded for their superior 
stability and noise tolerance in the brain – yet, the authors defaulted to continuous attractor 
models as the null hypothesis. A rational question to pose at this point is: why is this 
continuous-versus-discrete problem important to brain research?  
One answer, as outlined by VanRullen and Koch (2003), is that continuous 
representation “cannot satisfactorily account for a large body of psychophysical data”. 
For example, 1 cent does not typically have much value to most people. However, a person 
may decide to buy a product if priced at $1.99 – yet, refuse to buy the same product if 
priced 1 cent higher at $2.00. Such an abrupt (or step) change in the brain’s purchasing 
decision cannot be modeled using a continuous representation despite extensive attempts to 
do so (Basu, 1997). In contrast, models based on discrete representations are able to 
accommodate such an abrupt (or step) change. In decision-making literature, Varshney and 
Varshney (2017) showed that a Bayesian model using quantized (discrete) priors was able 
to better model racial discrimination behavior. In monetary economics, Khaw et al. (2017) 
found that a discrete model was a better fit to data from a price-setting experiment than the 
“optimal” (continuous) models. In mathematical psychology, Sun et al. (2012) applied a 
Bayes-optimal quantized (discrete) model of perception to datasets of animal vocalizations 
and human speech, closely mimicking the Weber-Fechner law. In theoretical neuroscience, 
Varshney et al. (2006) posited that neurons with discrete-valued synaptic states might 
perform better than neurons with continuous-valued synaptic states. In a recent 
electrophysiology experiment, Latimer et al. (2015) demonstrated extensively that a 
discrete (i.e. stepping) model is a better fit to neural (macaque LIP) data than a continuous 
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(ramping, diffusion-to-bound) model (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). In machine learning, 
discrete (i.e. quantized or binary) neural networks have been shown to be superior to 
continuous neural networks in terms of error rate performance (Lin et al., 2016) and 
computation speed (Hubara et al., 2016). 
 Another reason for favoring discrete representation, as suggested by Chaudhuri and 
Fiete (2016), is noise tolerance. There are many sources of noise in the brain (e.g. sensory 
noise, cellular noise, motor noise) – an extensive review of these noise sources can be 
found in Faisal et al. (2008). Due to the presence of noise, information that is represented 
or transported in continuous form inevitably degrades and becomes corrupted in an 
irrecoverable manner. Analogously, the quality of music that is recorded (or stored) in 
continuous form (a cassette tape) will slightly degrade due to noise every time it is 
replayed. On the other hand, the quality of music that is recorded (or stored) in discrete 
form (CD) is more robustly preserved in the presence of noise. In a wider context, 
information in the brain must be transmitted over a relatively long distance while 
preserving its quality. For example, information in human vision originates at the retina, 
and is conveyed to the LGN via the optic nerve, before arriving at the visual cortex located 
at the back of the brain – a distance spanning the entire length of the brain. Applying 
Shannon’s communications theory (Shannon, 1948) to communications in the brain, the 
presence of noise throughout such a transmission chain makes it unfeasible and 
implausible for the brain to employ continuous representation; noise will always 
accumulate and corrupt the information, no matter how small the noise is. 
In this paper, we approach this discrete-versus-continuous problem from a 
communications engineering perspective. Given the existence of noise, the requirements 
for long-range information transmission, and repeated retrievability/retransmissions 
(memory recall), we posit that information in the brain has to be represented in discrete 
form, rather than continuous (see Appendix 1). In subsequent sections, we will explore this 
discrete hypothesis using 3 approaches: 1) a computer simulation of information 
communications between 2 neurons; 2) a psychophysics (behavioral) experiment on 
probability estimation; 3) a re-analysis of a published behavioral experiment on 
intertemporal choice. In each instance, we clearly demonstrate the superior performance of 
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discrete representation. Overall, our results conclude that the brain must represent (and 
process) information in discrete form, and must integrate communications aspects directly 
with computational processes. 
 
 
 
Part 1: A Computer Simulation of Information Communications 
Between 2 Neurons 
 
This section posits that the brain communicates and computes in a discrete manner. 
While physical signals may be continuous-valued, the communicated or computed 
information is discrete in nature. We demonstrate this via a set of simulations. 
The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) (Rescorla, 2016) posits that the 
mind/brain is a computational system, where mental processes such as reasoning, decision-
making and problem solving are computations. Marr (1982) further subdivides these 
mind/brain computations into 3 levels, namely, computational theory (goals of the 
computation), representation and algorithms (inputs, transformations and outputs), and 
hardware implementation (neural realizations). There is, however, a major gap in CTM – it 
does not include a communications component. Computation alone is not useful, because 
the results must be transmitted to where they will be used. Otherwise, computation is 
merely an energy-consuming, heat-generating process. For example, suppose that an 
encrypted file is to be decrypted by a federal intelligence agency in a brute force manner 
using a supercomputer. Once the supercomputer has successfully cracked the encryption, 
the resulting file must be transmitted to a useful destination. Otherwise, it remains 
inaccessible, and therefore, useless. In fact, the encrypted file has to be transmitted to the 
supercomputer in the first place, before decryption begins. Similarly in the brain, 
information must be communicated (or transported) before (and after) computation can be 
performed. For example, the sight of a rattlesnake, when detected by the eye/retina, has to 
be transmitted to the brain via the optic nerve and LGN before any visual recognition 
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(computation) (“this object is a rattlesnake”) occurs; once the rattlesnake has been 
identified, the resulting computational output has to be communicated to another part of 
the brain so that the appropriate cognitive decision (“avoid this danger”) can be computed. 
Communication is thus a necessary prerequisite to computations in the brain, and 
therefore, must be integrated with computation.  
How may communications be integrated with computations? And, how may 
communications be related to information representation? The answers are also closely 
related to the presence of noise in the brain (Faisal et al., 2008). First, it is clear that 
communications in the brain must occur in the presence of noise, which is ubiquitous. 
Shannon’s communications theory (Shannon, 1948) posits that any communications via 
electrical signals, radio signals, or fiber optic signals will always occur in the presence of 
noise, and inherently employs a discrete representation of the information. Noise will 
inevitably degrade the information if continuous representation is employed. Second, given 
that the communicated information is represented in discrete form, computations using 
such an input must also be represented in discrete form. Furthermore, the output of a 
computation must be communicated to a different part of the brain in discrete form. Adrian 
(1914) first discovered that propagation of neural spikes follows an all or none principle, 
implying that spike propagation is binary (digital, discrete). This principle is well 
understood and accepted in neuroscience in terms of its neurobiological implementation 
(Rieke et al., 1997). Rushton (1961) concluded that the neural signaling of a typical human 
myelinated nerve fiber spanning, say, between a finger and the spinal cord cannot employ a 
continuous representation due to the presence of noise. Despite these seminal works, 
computational models based on continuous representation dominate present-day 
neuroscience literature – for example, continuous attractor networks (Eliasmith, 2005; 
Wang, 2009). The computer simulation work of this section is focused on the 
neurobiological mechanism of information communications between 2 neurons to 
demonstrate the distorting and degrading effects of stochastic noise in the brain, 
particularly when a continuous representation is employed. 
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METHODS 
 
Rushton (1961) examined the transmission properties of a single myelinated axon 
with the myelin sheathing delimited at regular intervals by Nodes of Ranvier (NoR). He 
recognized that Nodes of Ranvier (NoR) serve as boosting (or relay) stations, repeatedly 
restoring the action potential signal to its initial level (which otherwise would be severely 
attenuated) during propagation along the axon. Our approach is an adaptation of Rushton 
(1961). In order to simulate communications or information transmission between 2 
neurons connected by a myelinated axon, we employ the communications systems model 
defined by Shannon (1948) (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Classical model of a general communications system (Shannon, 1948). The 
noise source can have any statistical distribution, such that this model can accommodate 
and be applied to any form of neural communications channels.  
 
 
At the transmitter (transmitting neuron): The information source is assumed have M 
possible coding (amplitude) levels. Its precision is varied from 2 coding levels (M=2) to 
1001 (M=1001, having 3 decimal places of precision) in order to examine the effects of 
noise as the number of coding levels increases. The case of M=1001 levels serves as our 
proxy for continuous representation. Here, for simplicity, we assume amplitude 
modulation, with amplitude levels (coding levels) normalized and equally spaced between 
0 and 1 (i.e. [0,1]). Note that, even though we are simulating the effect of numerous coding 
levels, the approach is extendable to other modulation schemes (Proakis, 2000; Haykin, 
2001; Vitetta et al., 2013), such as frequency modulation (normalized 0 is the minimum 
frequency and normalized 1 the maximum frequency). 
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The channel and noise source: Rushton (1961) modeled both the spike signal degradation 
and the boosting due to each myelin-Node of Ravier (NoR) segment as a constant 
multiplicative noise (i.e. each myelin-NoR segment has the same multiplicative 
degradation factor). For example, a 1% degradation/boosting error is modeled as 0.99n, 
where n is the number of myelin-NoR segments; the signal degrades multiplicatively after 
each segment, such that if n were of indefinite length, the signal would eventually vanish. 
However, degradations and boostings along the axon are actually stochastic, something his 
approach did not take into account. Our work extends and refines Rushton’s approach by 
introducing stochasticity, where each myelin-NoR segment is modeled as an additive 
Gaussian noise source as in Figure 2. This additive noise approach is appropriate given that 
the cable model of the axon (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952) consists of capacitors and resistors 
(additive circuitry), instead of transistors/amplifiers (multiplicative circuitry). This 
adaptation allows us to simulate the cumulative effect of stochastic noise during 
information transmission along the axon. We note here that, even though the input to the 
channel (the transmitted signal) is discrete (i.e. possessing M possible coding levels, 
ranging from 2 to 1001), the channel itself is continuous due to the nature of the noise 
(continuous Gaussian distribution). In this sense, the information is represented in a 
discrete form, but is communicated over a continuous channel, akin to Morse Code 
(discrete information) transmitted over a continuous channel (electrical signals, or radio 
signals).  
 
 
Figure 2: The additive model of neuronal communications. An axon is modeled as a 
chain of myelin segments delimited by NoR. As the transmitted signal, A0 , propagates 
along the myelin, it is degraded by a conduction loss, Li , with a Gaussian distribution 
N(−µL ,σ L2 )  where −µL is the average conduction loss and σ L2  arises from thermal 
A0 A1 A2 A3 . . .  An 
L1 L2 L3 . . Ln . Bn 
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noise. At each NoR, the signal is boosted back up by Bi , with a Gaussian distribution 
N(+µL ,σ B2 )  where +µL  is the average boosting level and σ B2  arises from imperfect 
(noisy) boosting. After traversing one myelin-NoR segment, the signal, A1 , is 
represented by A1 = A0 + L1 + B1 , having a Gaussian distribution 
N(A0 − µL + µL ,σ L2 +σ B2 ) = N(A0,σ L2 +σ B2 ) . After traversing n  myelin-NoR segments 
along the axon, the signal becomes An = An−1 + Ln + Bn , with a Gaussian distribution
N(A0,n(σ L2 +σ B2 )) , which is the signal that arrives at the receiver/destination neuron 
(i.e. the received signal). 
 
 
At the receiver (receiving neuron): Due to noise, the received signal differs from the 
transmitted signal. Given the received signal, signal detection theory (Peterson et al., 1954) 
is employed at the receiver to find the optimum (most likely) estimate of the transmitted 
signal. For example, with 2 coding levels (binary coding), there are 2 possible coded 
amplitude levels within the range [0,1], namely a 0 message or a 1 message. If a 0 message 
is transmitted, and a 0.3023 signal received (due to noise perturbation), then, optimal 
signal detection (Peterson et al., 1954) will decode this signal as a 0 message (i.e. optimal 
detection threshold is 0.5). If there were 1001 coding levels in the range [0,1], there are 
1001 possible amplitude levels that are used for encoding information to be transmitted. 
We note that 1001 coding levels in the range [0,1] is equivalent to having 3 decimal places 
of encoding precision. In this case, if a 0 message is transmitted, and a 0.3023 signal 
received, then, optimal signal detection would decode this as a 0.302 message (since 0.302 
is one of the 1001 legitimate encoding levels), thereby resulting in a communications error 
(a 0 message was transmitted but a 0.302 message decoded) due to noise perturbation. The 
signal detection theory employed here (Peterson et al., 1954) is the same as that employed 
in psychology and neuroscience (Tanner & Swets, 1954). It is also the same theory 
employed in psychophysics to estimate the psychometric functions of Alternative Force 
Choice (AFC) tasks with M possible choices (i.e. M-AFC tasks, where M>1) (Kingdom & 
Prins, 2010).  
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RESULTS 
 
Noise accumulation after n myelin-NoR segments: We first simulated the effect of noise 
accumulation as a function of the number of myelin-NoR segments, n. In Figure 3, we 
show examples of how the amplitudes of two transmitted signal levels (A0 = 0.2 ; A0 = 0.8
) may change across multiple myelin-NoR segments. We chose the noise variance levels as 
σ L
2 =σ B
2 = 0.0001 for convenience. In both graphs, we can see that the actual signal level 
after n myelin-NoR segments (shown as blue dots) deviates significantly from the 
transmitted level, A0  (shown as a red dashed line). For the case of A0 = 0.2  (i.e. top graph), 
the signal is very close to zero after 100 myelin-NoR segments, due to the accumulation of 
thermal and boosting (or relaying) noise. In the case of A0 = 0.8  (bottom graph), the signal 
remains close to one after 100 myelin-NoR segments. Note that the graphs/results shown 
are merely 2 of the many possible outcomes of the transmitted signal due to the stochastic 
nature of the noise. The key conclusion is that, due to noise accumulation, the amplitude of 
the received signal can be very different from that of the transmitted signal. 
 
 
Figure 3: Two examples of the effect of noise accumulation on the transmitted signal after 
n myelin-NoR segments. The red dashed lines are the transmitted signals, whereas the blue 
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dots are the actual signals after n myelin-NoR segments. Top graph) Results for the case of 
transmitted signal A0 = 0.2 . Bottom graph) Results for the case of transmitted signal 
A0 = 0.8 . 
 
 
Next, we simulated a transmitted signal of level A0 = 0.5  sent repeatedly along the 
axon (100,000 times). Each column in Figure 4 shows the histogram of the received 
signals after 1, 10 and 100 myelin-NoR segments respectively. Each row in Figure 4 
represents a different level of thermal and/or boosting noise (0.0001, 0.001 and 0.01). 
Again, for convenience, we assumed that σ L
2 =σ B
2 . The vertical red lines signify the 
transmitted signals of level A0 = 0.5 . In the first row (lowest noise variance), we see that 
the width of the histogram grows increasingly wider, such that the histogram after 100 
segments has a very large spread compared to the transmitted signal (vertical red line). In 
the second row (noise variance = 0.001), the histogram looks similarly wide after only 10 
segments. After 100 segments, the histogram looks essentially like a uniform distribution, 
which is very different from the transmitted signal (vertical red line). In the third row 
(noise variance = 0.01), we see that the histogram has a wide spread after only 1 segment. 
After 10 segments, the histogram looks like a uniform distribution. We note that a uniform 
distribution implies that the received signal is a uniform random number between 0 and 1, 
even though each of the 100,000 transmitted signals has an identical level of 0.5. Thus, due 
to the accumulation of noise, the distribution of the received signals is very different to that 
of the transmitted signal. To provide perspective on what 100 myelin-NoR segments 
translate to in terms of the nervous system, there is an estimated 800 myelin-NoR segments 
between a person’s finger and the spinal cord (Rushton, 1961). 
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Figure 4: Histogram of the received signals for the transmitted signal of level A0 = 0.5  
(i.e. vertical red lines) which was communicated repeatedly 100,000 times along the axon. 
Each column represents the histogram of the received signals after 1, 10 and 100 myelin-
NoR segments respectively. Each row represents a different level of thermal and boosting 
noise (i.e. 0.0001, 0.001 and 0.01). For convenience, we assume that σ L
2 =σ B
2 . 
 
 
Quantifying information degradation: Searching the literature, we were unsuccessful in 
locating previous work in quantifying how information degrades along the axon. The 
contribution of the present work lies in the use of Shannon mutual information (Cover, 
2006) to quantify how the input information degrades across myelin-NOR segments along 
the axon (output). We may write the mutual information of any channel (of input X and 
output Y) as: 
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I(X;Y ) = H (X)− H (X |Y )  
 
where H (X)  is the marginal entropy and H (X |Y )  is the conditional entropy. For ease of 
comparison, we use the normalized mutual information (NMI) (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002): 
 
NMI = I(X;Y )H (X)H (Y )  
 
Here, an NMI value of 1 means that no information has been lost, whereas an NMI value 
of 0 means that all information has been lost. 
Figure 5 shows the NMI after n myelin-NoR segments for various numbers of 
coding levels ranging from 2 to 1001. As above, we utilize the case of 1001 coding levels 
as a proxy for continuous representation. At one extreme, for the case of 2 coding levels, 
NMI remains almost unchanged (i.e. 0.9952) after 100 segments: almost no information is 
lost. As the number of coding levels increase, NMI drops noticeably. At the other extreme, 
for 1001 coding levels, NMI decreases to 0.0027 after 100 segments: almost none of the 
original transmitted information remains. In fact, NMI drops from 1 to 0.1148 after only 1 
segment, and 0.0203 after 10 segments. It is obvious that, for more than 1001 coding levels 
(nearly continuous), information degradation increases. The key result is that information 
is lost rapidly when a continuous representation is employed. For a discrete representation, 
fewer coding levels lead to lower and slower information loss. 
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Figure 5: Information degradation after n myelin-NoR segments for different numbers of 
coding levels, ranging from 2 to 1001 (i.e. 3 decimal places). For a fair comparison, all 
noise levels are fixed at 0.0001. 
 
 
Noise accumulation after N neurons: We extended our simulation to transmission 
through multiple successive neurons, where each is modeled as consisting of 100 myelin-
NoR segments. Figure 6 shows the information degradation after N neurons. Not 
surprisingly, for the case of 1001 coding levels (our proxy for continuous representation), 
information is almost completely lost after 10 neurons (NMI = 0.0002). For the discrete 
case of 2 coding levels, NMI remains at 0.9676 after 10 successive neurons. The results 
here agree with those in the previous graph; information is lost rapidly when a continuous 
representation is employed, and fewer coding levels lead to much less rapid information 
loss. 
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Figure 6: Information degradation after N neurons. 
 
 
INTERIM DISCUSSION 
 
A complete theory of mind/brain must include both computation and communication. 
Our work demonstrates that, in the presence of noise, it is impossible to communicate 
reliably between neurons under repeated transmissions using continuous representation. 
This result provides a neurobiological basis to support the discrete representation of 
information in the brain. We emphasize that there is currently no consensus in 
neuroscience on how spikes convey information. Nevertheless, our discrete conclusion 
here is generalizable to most commonly theorized forms of neural coding schemes, such as 
spike-count rate coding (Dayan & Abbott, 2001), interspike interval (ISI) coding (Rieke et 
al., 1997) and Recurrent Neural Network models (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943; Zhang et al., 
2014; Yuste, 2015). For example, in the case of spike-count rate coding, suppose that a 
neuron were to convey a message encoded as 20 spikes/sec. Due to precision limitations 
and noise, a neuron cannot consistently send exactly the same 20 spikes/sec signal each 
σ L
2 =σ B
2 = 0.0001
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
after N neurons
no
rm
ali
ze
d 
m
ut
ua
l in
fo
rm
at
ion
Information degradation after N neurons
 
 
      2 coding levels
      3 coding levels
      4 coding levels
      5 coding levels
    11 coding levels (1 d.p.)
  101 coding levels (2 d.p.)
1001 coding levels (3 d.p.)
Running title: Information Representation in the Brain 
 18 
time; on one occasion, it may send 19 spikes/sec, while on another occasion, it may send 
22 spikes/sec. It is then plausible that all rates between, say, 19 and 22 spikes/sec convey 
the same message in discrete form, as opposed to the continuous case where 19 spikes/sec 
conveys a different message to 19.5 spikes/sec. In subsequent sections of this paper, we 
further explore our discrete hypothesis using behavioral experiments. 
 
 
 
Part 2: A Psychophysics (Behavioral) Experiment on Probability 
Estimation 
 
Humans have a tendency to overestimate small probabilities (dying in an airplane 
crash, winning the Powerball jackpot lottery) and underestimate large probabilities (e.g. 
getting lung cancer from smoking cigarettes) when making decisions under risk and 
uncertainty. These subjective probabilities are typically modeled using a probability 
distortion (or weighting) function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Camerer & Ho, 1994; 
Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). It is commonly assumed that subjective probability 
is represented in the brain in continuous form (a Real number that can take any value 
between 0 and 1). Such an assumption may result in inaccurate analytical findings if 
participants’ decisions are made using a non-continuous (finite precision) representation. 
For example, if a participant were to choose between a $100 lottery of probability 0.89721, 
versus, a $150 lottery of probability 0.50219, the participant will typically round the 
numbers when making the choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). By doing so, the choice is 
greatly simplified to a $100 lottery with probability 0.9, versus, a $150 lottery with 
probability 0.5. Then, analysis performed using a continuous representation is, strictly 
speaking, inaccurate because 0.89721 is actually treated indifferently to 0.9. Rounding 
implies that a range of probabilities is treated as being the same (indifferent). This 
inconvenient problem is often ignored because standard (continuous) models cannot easily 
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take into account such indifference. While the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
expected rounding (i.e. “editing”), they did not quantify it.  
Quantization (Gray & Neuhoff, 1998) is the term used to describe an encoding 
process in which a continuous quantity (a Real number or analog signal) is systematically 
divided into a finite number of possible categories. We note that the term “quantization” is 
loosely synonymous to terminologies such as discretization, chunking, categorization and 
classification. The term “discrete” is common in neuroscience, whereas the term 
“quantized” is more common in engineering. Here, we use both terms interchangeably. 
Rounding a number is the oldest example of quantization (Sheppard, 1898). Oliver et al. 
(1948) employed quantization to convert continuous signals (e.g. audio/voice) to their 
digital (i.e. binary) forms to enable the maximum possible efficiency of data compression 
and communications (Shannon, 1948), laying the theoretical foundations for almost all 
communications systems in use today. For binary quantization, the total number of 
categories equals to 2n, where n is the quantization precision expressed in bits. For 
example, suppose that we are encoding probabilities (Real numbers in the interval [0,1]). If 
n were one, then we have only two (21) output categories. We might encode all quantities 
in the interval [0, 0.5] as the first output category, with the remaining probabilities (0.5, 1] 
as the second category. The distinction between substantially different probabilities such as 
0.001 and 0.5 is lost in the encoding (i.e. 0.001 and 0.5 are mapped indifferently to the 
same category). When n is large, such as 24 bits, we can encode to 224 possible very finely 
spaced categories, resulting in only a very small loss of precision compared to the actual 
Real number. Thus, a large number of bits represents a higher level of precision (in the 
engineering sense). A continuous quantity is therefore the special case where n à ∞. Note 
that, in typical electrophysiology equipment, continuous neural signals (electrical voltage 
data in neurons) from electrodes are passed on to a high precision (16-bit) analog-to-digital 
converter (ADC, also known as a quantizer) before being stored as a digital/discrete data 
file (Squires, 2013).  
Building on Shannon’s work (Shannon, 1948), Miller (1956) hypothesized that the 
magical number 7, plus or minus 2, represents the brain’s capacity limit for processing 
information. He reported experimental evidence showing that the brain’s accuracy limit for 
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absolute judgments of the position of a pointer in a linear interval to be about 3.25 bits, 
suggesting that the brain categorizes (discretized or quantized) stimuli into 9 or 10 (23.25 = 
9.5) discrete categories (instead of a continuous or infinite number of categories). Similar 
to Miller’s work, we hypothesize that the brain has a capacity limit in estimating 
probabilities. This implies that probability estimates in humans may not be represented as a 
continuum between 0 and 1, but rather, as a discrete set of categories (say, very low, low, 
medium, high, and very high), such that certain ranges of distinct probability values (say, 
from 0.1 to 0.3) will be treated indifferently (discretized into the same “low” category). In 
this section, we conduct three human behavioral experiments and analyze the experimental 
data using a novel quantized (i.e. discrete) probability distortion function, in comparison to 
the conventional/continuous probability distortion function. 
 
 
A NOVEL QUANTIZED (DISCRETE) MODEL OF PROBABILITY 
 
At present, subjective probability is modeled by several different probability 
distortion (or weighting) functions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Camerer & Ho, 1994; 
Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999), all of which assume continuous representation. In 
the present work, we will use the two-parameter continuous function by Prelec (1998), 
defined as: 
 
 
 
where δ > 0 and γ > 0. Depending on the values of δ and γ, this function can be either s or 
inverse-S shaped. Figure 7C shows an example of a continuous Prelec function.  
  
w(x) = e−δ (− log x )γ
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Figure 7: Examples of continuous functions and their corresponding quantized versions. 
(A) Continuous linear function y = x. (B) 3-bit quantized version of linear function, Q3[x]. 
The arrows show the quantization effect, where two different values of x (i.e. 0.39 in blue, 
and 0.47 in green) both map to the same (indifferent) value of y (i.e. ~0.42 in purple). (C) 
Continuous Prelec function, wa(x), with δ = 0.9 and γ = 0.6. (D) 3-bit quantized version of 
the Prelec function, Q3[wa(x)]. 
 
 
We quantize (Gray & Neuhoff, 1998) the continuous Prelec function, resulting in 
the novel quantized (discrete) version: 
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Qn[w(x)]=Qn[e−δ (− log x )
γ ] 	
 
where w(x) is a continuous Prelec function as above, n is the number of bits and Qn[.] is a 
quantization function. The quantization function divides the continuous probability space 
[0,1] into 2n equally spaced steps, with each step size being equal to 2-n (the step sizes of 
the corresponding values of n are shown in Appendix 2, Table S1, third column,). Using y 
= x as a simple example, y = Q3[x] divides y into 23 = 8 equally spaced steps. These are 
plotted in Figures 7A and 7B. The quantization (or systematic rounding) effect is further 
demonstrated in the 3-bit graph (Figure 7B), where it is shown that two different values of 
x (i.e. 0.39 in blue, and 0.47 in green) both map to the same (indifferent) value of y (~0.42 
in purple). In the same manner, a continuous Prelec function, wa(x), can be quantized to 
produce y = Qn[wa(x)]. This quantized function is specified by 3 parameters: δ, γ and n. 
Figures 7C and 7D show such a continuous Prelec function (δ = 0.9, γ = 0.6) and its 
corresponding 3-bit quantized version respectively. We note that n determines the step 
size, while δ and γ determine where these steps occur. If n is large enough, the quantized 
Prelec function becomes almost indistinct from the continuous version. A continuous 
Prelec function is a special case of the quantized Prelec function with n à ∞. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
In the following, we consider 3 psychophysics experiments, based on roulette wheels. 
 
Ethical approval: All human experimental procedures were performed at New York 
University in accordance with the guidelines of the National Institutes of Health and 
approved by the University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects 
(UCAIHS) serving as New York University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). The 
experimental protocol was explained to all participants, after which they provided their 
written informed consent.  
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Experiment 1: This is a 2-event conjunction task, as shown in Figure 8A. During each trial 
of the 2-wheel task, a participant has up to 10 seconds to choose between a single roulette 
wheel with probability r of success and a pair of independent roulette wheels with 
probabilities x and z of success. The participant’s estimates of x, z, and r were based on 
visual judgments of the fraction of each roulette wheel colored gold. After a participant has 
made his/her choice, the wheels were spun simultaneously at random speeds, and the 
participant won a monetary prize if he: (i) chose the single wheel and it stopped in the 
gold, or, (ii) chose the pair and both stopped in the gold. A staircase procedure (Cornsweet, 
1962; Wetherill & Levitt, 1965) was used to estimate the r for which the participant chose 
the pair as often as the single wheel: r ~ (x,z). Twelve experimental conditions (i.e. x,z 
pairs) were presented (see Appendix 3, Figure S1A). By design, x is always greater than or 
equal to z.  
 
                                    
Figure 8: A) The 2-event (or 2-wheel) conjunction task. B) The 3-event (or 3-wheel) 
conjunction task of experiment 3. 
 
 
Experiment 2: Here, we ran the same design as experiment 1, except for the experimental 
conditions (x,z pairs) where we employed a different set of 15 experimental conditions 
(see Appendix 3, Figure S1B). 
 
P(win) = x P(win) = z 
P(win) = r 
P(win) = x P(win) = z P(win) = y 
P(win) = r 
A B 
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Experiment 3: The design setup for this experiment is identical to the previous 
experiments, except that it is a 3-event conjunction task (see Figure 8B). Twenty 
experimental conditions were employed (see Appendix 3, Figure S1C). By design, x > y > 
z.  
 
Participants: There was a total of 87 distinct participants: 23 participants for experiment 1; 
21 for experiment 2; and 44 for experiment 3; one participant participated in both 
experiments 1 and 3. All participants were naïve, and aged between 18 and 36 years old. 
There were 53 females and 34 males. Participants were paid $12 per hour. At the end of 
each experiment, a previously completed trial was randomly drawn, and if this trial was 
one that the participant had previously won, a $10 bonus was paid.  
 
Measurement and stimuli presentation: We used a one-up/one-down staircase procedure 
Cornsweet, 1962; Wetherill & Levitt, 1965) with 50 trials per experimental condition such 
that experiments 1, 2 and 3 consisted of 600, 750 and 1,000 trials respectively. In each 
experiment, successive conditions were presented in a random order. The horizontal order 
of the “large” (i.e. x), “midsize” (i.e. y) and “small” (i.e. z) wheels was randomized to 
mitigate order effects. The vertical placement (top or bottom) of the staircase wheel (r) and 
the conjunction wheels were also randomized. 30-second mandatory breaks were spaced 
up uniformly throughout the experiment; experiment 1 had 9 breaks; experiment 2 had 10; 
experiment 3 had 13. The experiments were implemented using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 
1997; Pelli, 1997), carried out on a 19” touchscreen powered by Windows XP. 
 
Conjunction fallacy: When two events, X and Z, are independent, their conjunction (2-
event) probability is the product of the constituent probabilities: P(X & Z) = P(X)P(Z). 
Mathematically, a conjunction probability cannot be greater than the probability of its 
constituents, such that P(X & Z) ≤ P(X) ≤ P(Z). In the “Linda the bank teller” study of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983), they found that 85% of participants (i.e. 75/88 
participants) violated this ordinal rule, thereby committing conjunction fallacy. To 
investigate conjunction fallacy, we used a one-tailed binomial test against the ordinal rule 
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at a 0.05 level of significance. 
 
Data fitting: Maximum likelihood estimation (Myung, 2003) was employed to fit the 
experimental data to each model. All estimations were performed in Matlab at double 
precision (Matlab’s default).  
 
Nested hypothesis tests: Nested hypothesis tests (Mood et al., 1974) were conducted at a 
0.05 level of significance. For the 2-wheel task of experiments 1 and 2, we used two 
quantized Prelec functions to model the conjunction, r = Qk[wa(x)]Qn[wc(z)], where 
Qk[wa(x)] and Qn[wc(z)] are the quantized Prelec functions for the conjunction pair (for 
wheel x, k is the precision and wa is the continuous Prelec function; for wheel z, n is the 
precision and wc is the Prelec function). This model was applied to a hierarchical sequence 
of nested hypothesis tests to determine whether: 
1. the participants were distorting x and z at all (homogeneous linear case, where 
estimated probabilities are objective, not subjective);  
2. both x and z were subjectively distorted using the same Prelec function (homogeneous 
Prelec case);  
3. x and z were subjective distorted using different Prelec functions (non-homogeneous 
Prelec case). 
All nested models employed for the 2-wheel task of experiments 1 and 2 are summarized 
in Appendix 4 (Figure S2A). For the 3-wheel task of experiment 3, we used three 
quantized Prelec functions to model the conjunction, r = Qk[wa(x)]Qm[wb(y)]Qn[wc(z)], 
where Qk[wa(x)], Qm[wb(y)] and Qn[wc(z)] are the corresponding quantized Prelec 
functions for the conjunction triplet. A similar hierarchical sequence of nested hypothesis 
tests was applied. All nested models employed for the 3-wheel task are summarized in 
Appendix 4 (Figure S2B).  
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RESULTS 
 
Experiment 1: Three out of 23 participants repeatedly committed conjunction fallacy. For 
the rest of this paper, all conjunction fallacy participants are excluded. Data fitting is 
applied to the remaining 20 subjects. Figure 9A plots a heatmap of the negative log 
likelihood of the maximum likelihood estimation process for one sample participant. 
Precisions range from 1 to 10 bits, with darker shades showing inferior fits and lighter 
shades superior fits. On the heatmap, the highest precision is located on the bottom right 
corner where both x and z are 10 bits. We note that, perceptually, 10 bits of precision has 
very fine step sizes of 2-10 ≈ 0.001 (see Table S1). This corresponds to about 0.35 degrees 
on the wheel (see Table S1), which is almost indiscernible to the naked eye. As the 
precision decreases (i.e. moving from the bottom right corner toward the middle), the fit 
improves. The best fit occurs where x and z are both 5 bits (i.e. white square). This trend 
offered the first clue that a quantized model may be a better fit than the continuous model.  
 
                       
Figure 9: Negative log likelihood of model fits for one sample participant for the 2-wheel 
task of experiment 1. (A) The heatmap for the 6-parameter Qk[wa(x)]Qn[wc(z)] model prior 
to the nested hypothesis tests. (B) The graph for the 5-parameter Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wc(z)] model 
after passing nested hypothesis test 1, showing best fit at 5 bits of precision. 
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In terms of nested hypothesis tests, none of the 20 participants passed the linear 
case (no subjective distortions), 6 participants are homogeneous (same Prelec function for 
x and z) and 14 participants are non-homogeneous (different Prelec functions for x and z).  
Details are included in Appendix 5 (Table S2). Interestingly, 17 participants had the same 
precision for x and z (Qk[.]Qk[.] models). The negative log likelihood for the same sample 
participant is plotted in Figure 9B. This participant passed the test for non-homogeneous 
Prelec distortion with x and z having the same precision (i.e. Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wc(z)]), which is 
why the plot is a line instead of a heatmap. The dashed horizontal red line shows the 
negative log likelihood value for the continuous model. As the precision decreases, the fit 
improves, with the best fit occurring at 5 bits. This characteristic shape of the negative log 
likelihood for the quantized case is found for all participants.  
The distributions of the best fit precisions of wheels x and z for all participants are 
plotted in Figures 10A and 10B respectively, confirming that the quantized models fit the 
experimental data better than the continuous models. The best fit precisions range from 2 
to 5 bits, with modes of 4 bits. If deviations from the mode are not significant, a model 
whereby the precision of the Prelec function is held constant could be a good fit. Such a 
model would have one less free parameter (allowing one extra degree of freedom). We 
note that a two-parameter continuous Prelec function is a special case of the three-
parameter quantized Prelec function with the precision fixed at ∞. Therefore, by fixing the 
precision at 4 bits instead of allowing it to be a free parameter (i.e. Q4[.]Q4[.] instead of 
Qk[.]Qk[.]), we remove one free parameter from the function. We repeated the nested 
hypothesis test with three additional 4-bit models included in our hypotheses (nested 
hypothesis test 2) and the results are shown in Appendix 5 (Table S3). Overall, nested 
hypothesis test 2 produced two key findings: 70% of participants (i.e. 14/20) were non-
homogeneous; 70% of participants (i.e. 14/20) were best fit to 4-bit models. The typical 
probability distortion curves of a homogeneous and non-homogeneous participant are 
shown in Figures 10C and 10D respectively. For further interpretations of homogenous and 
non-homogenous participants, see Appendix 6.  
 
 
Running title: Information Representation in the Brain 
 28 
 
 
Figure 10: Distributions of best fit precisions, and typical probability distortion curves. 
(A, B) Distributions of best fit precisions of wheels x and z for all participants from 
experiment 1 after passing nested hypothesis test 1. This confirms that quantized models do 
fit the experimental data better than continuous models, with a mode of 4 bits for both 
wheels x and z. (C, D) The probability distortion curves of typical homogeneous and non-
homogeneous participants of experiment 1. 
 
 
Experiment 2: Five out of 21 participants committed conjunction fallacy, which is 
consistent with experiment 1. The same data fitting and nested hypothesis tests were 
applied to the remaining 16 participants. Nested hypothesis tests results (detailed in 
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Appendix 5, Table S4) resemble those of experiment 1: 63% of participants (10/16) were 
non-homogeneous; 94% of participants (15/16) were best fit to 4-bit models. These results, 
along with probability distortion curves (not shown), are consistent with those of 
experiment 1, which tells us that the results of experiment 1 were generalizable and not 
specific to its experimental conditions. 
 
Experiment 3: Four out of 44 participants committed conjunction fallacy, which is 
consistent with the findings from experiments 1 and 2. Similar data fitting and nested 
hypothesis tests were applied to the remaining 40 participants. Nested hypothesis tests 
results (detailed in Appendix 5, Table S5) resemble those of the 2-wheel experiments: 55% 
of participants (22/40) were non-homogenous; 75% of participants (30/40) were best fit to 
4-bit models. Typical probability distortion curves of a homogeneous and non-
homogeneous participant are shown in Appendix 6 (Figures S3B and S3D).  
 
 
INTERIM DISCUSSION 
 
To summarize, Figure 11 compares the best-fit 4-bit quantized probability model 
(in black) with the best-fit continuous probability model (in red) for one sample 
participant. The stimuli (wheels of experiment) are plotted as dots. The gap between the 
black line and the red curve represents the effect size (the difference between the quantized 
model versus the continuous model). For some stimuli conditions, the effect size is small 
(e.g. highlighted in blue), whereas for other stimuli conditions, the effect size is quite large 
(e.g. highlighted in green). A visual intuition for quantized probability is further illustrated 
in Appendix 7. Regardless of whether the effect sizes are small or large, the 4-bit quantized 
model makes a substantially different prediction in human subjective probability when 
compared to the continuous model.  
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Figure 11: Illustration of the effect sizes between the best-fit 4-bit model and the best-fit 
continuous model for one sample participant. 
 
 
Overall, 78% of all participants (59/76) were best fit to 4-bit probability models, 
having 4 bits of quantization per wheel (see Appendix 8 for a summary of all model 
parameters). On the basis of these results, we conclude that probability is almost certainly 
represented in a discrete manner in the brain, and very likely to be at 4 bits of precision, as 
opposed to the commonly assumed continuous representation. 
 
 
 
Part 3: A Re-analysis of a Published Behavioral Experiment on 
Intertemporal Choice 
 
Intertemporal choice, also known as discounting, focuses on value decision trade-offs 
at different points in time. For example, would you prefer to receive a $10 payment today 
(present option), or wait for now and receive a $15 payment next month (future option)? 
Experimental data on intertemporal choices are typically modeled using either a hyperbolic 
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discounting function (Mazur, 1987; Frederick et al., 2002); Green & Myerson, 2004) or an 
exponential discounting function (Laibson, 1997; Green & Myerson, 2004; Chabris et al., 
2008). The primary difference between the 2 lies in the steepness of the discounting 
curves; the hyperbolic function decays at a steeper pace than the exponential discounting 
function, signifying a value decision preference for the present option, as opposed to a 
future option. Equivalently, preference for the present option signifies a decision maker 
who will choose the future option only if the payment amount for the future option is 
significantly larger (say, $20) than the present option (say, $10). To date, discounting 
functions have been modeled in terms of continuous Real numbers. A quantized (discrete) 
representation of value was recently proposed (Woodford, 2014). We hypothesize that 
intertemporal choices (value with a time dimension) are also quantized. For example, 
people may treat (or discount) 16 days indifferently to 17 days. In this section, we re-
analyze the experimental data from Cox and Kable (2014) using novel quantized (discrete) 
discounting models, and compare them with conventional, continuous discounting models. 
 
 
A NOVEL QUANTIZED (DISCRETE) HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING MODEL  
 
Intertemporal choices are typically modeled using a continuous hyperbolic 
discounting function (Mazur, 1987):  
SV = A1+ kD
SV
A =
1
1+ kD
	
 
where A is the objective value, D is the time delay (in unit of days), k is the discount rate 
and SV is the subjective value. Figure 12 (left) shows an example of a conventional, 
continuous hyperbolic discounting function.  
We quantize (Gray & Neuhoff, 1998) the continuous hyperbolic function, resulting 
in the form: 
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where n is the number of bits and Qn denotes a quantization function that divides the 
hyperbolic discounting function into 2n possible steps or quantization levels. Figure 12 
(right) shows an example of a 3-bit quantized hyperbolic discounting model (3 bits = 23 = 
8 levels). We note here that the conventional, continuous model is simply a quantized 
model with an infinite number of steps (quantization levels). 
  
 
Figure 12: Left) Conventional, continuous hyperbolic discounting model. Right) 3-bit 
quantized hyperbolic discounting model. 
 
The same approach can also be applied to a conventional exponential discounting function 
(Laibson, 1997; Green & Myerson, 2004; Chabris et al., 2008), to produce a quantized 
exponential model (see Appendix 9). 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Our analysis is a re-examination of the human behavioral data previously collected 
for an fMRI study by Cox and Kable (2014). We first briefly outline their methods, which 
were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Pennsylvania (Cox 
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& Kable, 2014). During each trial, a participant chooses between 2 options: $40 now, or 
$X in D days. $X is capped at $100, while D ranges from 1 to 327 days. There were 204 
trials in total. Participants were paid $20 for their participation in the study. At the end of 
the experiment, one of the completed 204 trials was randomly selected and a bonus 
corresponding to the participant’s choice in the selected trial was paid. For example, if the 
randomly selected trial was a choice between receiving $40 now (present option) versus 
receiving $60 in 18 days’ time (future option) and the participant had (during the 
experiment) chosen the present option, then, a $40 bonus was paid to the participant. If the 
participant had chosen the future option instead, then, a $60 bonus was paid to the 
participant after an 18-day delay. The bonus was paid using a debit card with the 
corresponding delay date. A total of 20 participants performed the task. In terms of data 
analysis, we extended the same maximum likelihood estimation approach for data fitting 
(as in Cox and Kable, 2014)) using the quantized hyperbolic discounting model. We also 
employed nested hypothesis testing (Mood et al., 1974), similar to the approach in Part 2 
of this paper.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Figure 13 shows the negative log likelihood of the maximum likelihood estimation 
process for one sample participant. Precision range from 1 to 16 bits. The fit for the 
continuous model is shown in the horizontal dashed red line. As the quantized precision 
(i.e. blue line) increases from 1 to 5 bits, the fit improves (value of negative log likelihood 
decreases). Beyond that, the fit becomes worse (i.e. value of negative log likelihood 
increases) and subsequently flattens off at the level of the continuous model. The best fit 
occurs at a precision of 5 bits, suggesting that a quantized model may be a better fit than a 
continuous model. 
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Figure 13: Negative log likelihood of hyperbolic model fit for one sample participant. 
 
 
Of the 20 participants, 9 were best fit to 5-bit quantized hyperbolic models (i.e. 25 = 
32 steps). The histograms of fitted model parameters are shown in Figure 14. We note that 
the largest number of bits resulting from the data fitting exercise is 9 bits, representing a 
model with 29 = 512 levels; a continuous hyperbolic discounting model is the case of an 
infinite number of levels.  
 
 
Figure 14: Histogram of fitted parameters (20 participants) for the quantized hyperbolic 
model. 
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Our quantized hyperbolic discounting model has 2 free parameters (n and k). Since 
the experimental data has a mode of 5 bits, we applied a nested hypothesis test (Mood et 
al., 1974) on the model with precision fixed at 5 bits instead of being a free parameter:  
 
 
 
The model on the left has 2 free parameters (i.e. n, k) whereas the model on the right has 
only 1 free parameter (i.e. k). The purpose of the nested hypothesis test (Mood et al., 1974) 
is to explore whether the second parameter is statistically justifiable or required for the data 
fitting of each participant. We note that such a 1-parameter (k only) model is analogous to 
the conventional, continuous hyperbolic discounting model except that n is being fixed at 5 
bits instead of being fixed at infinity. Results of the nested hypothesis test showed that 17 
out of 20 participants were best fit to this 1-parameter model (k is a free parameter while n 
fixed at 5 bits). The 5-bit quantized hyperbolic discounting curves for two representative 
participants are shown in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15: 5-bit quantized hyperbolic discounting curves for two representative 
participants.  
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We also fit the experimental data to a quantized exponential model (see Appendix 
10). To summarize, 8 out of the 20 participants were best fit to the 5-bit quantized 
exponential models. After applying the nested hypothesis test, 15 out of the 20 participants 
were best fit to the 1-parameter quantized exponential model. These exponential model 
findings are consistent with the hyperbolic ones. 
 
 
INTERIM DISCUSSION 
 
For completeness, we compared the performance of the quantized hyperbolic 
model with the quantized exponential model (see Appendix 11). In summary, 13 out of 20 
participants were best fit to a quantized exponential model while the remaining 7 
participants were best fit to a quantized hyperbolic model. Overall, this best-of-the-best 
model comparison concluded that 15 out of 20 participants (75%) have 5-bit precision. A 
point to emphasize here is that all the quantized models are a better fit to the experimental 
data than their respective continuous versions. Our re-analysis of the intertemporal choice 
study by Cox and Kable (2014) confirms our hypothesis that intertemporal choices are 
indeed quantized. While continuous models have, up till now, been convenient for 
analyzing experimental data, we must be open to quantized approaches. Given that our 
quantized result here was attained based on an independent study (a study that was neither 
designed nor conducted by us), we are confident that our approach is generalizable to 
many existing and future studies. 
 
 
 
Overall Conclusions 
 
In Part 1, our computer simulations showed that information cannot be 
communicated reliably between neurons using a continuous representation due to the 
presence of noise. Information representation at the neural level has to be discrete. In Part 
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2, our extensive behavioral experiment on probability estimation found that data from all 
participants were better fit to quantized probability models than continuous ones, with 78% 
of all participants having 4-bit (16 steps) precision. Probability is very likely to be 
represented in a discrete rather than continuous form in the brain. In Part 3, our re-analysis 
of an independent study on intertemporal choice by Cox and Kable (2014) reaffirmed the 
findings of Part 2; that, data from all participants were better fit to quantized models than 
continuous ones (whether hyperbolic or exponential), with 75% of all participants having 
5-bit (32 steps) precision. The independent nature of Part 3 shows the generalizability of 
our approach to existing and future studies. Overall, the results from Parts 1, 2 and 3 
corroborate each other, supporting our discrete hypothesis of information representation in 
the brain. 
We hope that our extensive discrete results here, in conjunction with the macaque 
LIP discrete results of Latimer et al. (2015), resolve the question of information 
representation in the brain question, once and for all. Going forward, we firmly believe that 
the correct research question to explore is no longer that of continuous-versus-discrete, but 
rather, how fine grained the discreteness is (how many bits of precision). It is very 
plausible that different parts of the brain (e.g. visual, auditory, cognitive decision-making) 
operate at different levels of discreteness based on different numbers of quantization 
levels. For example, camera photographs are commonly encoded in 24-bit RGB color (i.e. 
16,777,216 distinct colors) whereas CD music is commonly encoded in 16-bit audio (i.e. 
65,536 distinct levels of loudness), representing (or approaching) the maximum limits of 
the brain’s visual and auditory precisions/discreteness respectively.  
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Appendix 1: Three Key Aspects of Communications in the Brain 
 
In order to tackle the question of continuous versus discrete representation, we have 
examined the brain’s internal information communications requirements, and now 
summarize them as the following 3 key aspects of communications: 
 
1) Information in the brain must be transmitted reliably: Some information in the 
sensory system must be transmitted over a relatively long distance while retaining its 
fidelity. One such example is vision. Information in human vision originates at the 
retina, is conveyed via the optic nerve to the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) and 
arrives at the visual cortex, located at the back of the brain – a distance spanning 
almost the entire length of the brain (Nolte, 2008). The fidelity of the visual 
information must be retained throughout this transmission process. Otherwise, vision 
will fail. 
 
2) Information in the brain must be stored and retrieved repeatedly: One example of 
this is memory. Our mind needs to be able to remember/recall/retrieve the same 
information (e.g. date of birth) repeatedly on many occasions possibly throughout an 
entire lifetime, upon which we would decide on the desired course of action (e.g. how 
should I celebrate my birthday this year?). Without memory, there is no means to relate 
to significant information and experiences in our lives. Being able to store and retrieve 
information repeatedly is crucial to the brain’s function. 
 
3) Noise must exist in the brain: All electrical processes, including neural spikes, are 
noisy due to thermal fluctuations, known as thermal noise or Johnson noise 
(Perepelitsa, 2006). There are additional sources of noise in the brain, such as sensory 
noise and motor noise (Faisal et al., 2008). Noise affects both information transmission 
and repeated retrieval of stored information (accessing memory). In the first, noise can 
degrade/corrupt the information during transmission. In the second, stored information 
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(memory) could be further compromised by the very act of retrieving/accessing it. That 
is, accessing memory content risks altering it.  
 
A major consequence of these aspects is that information representation in the brain 
almost certainly cannot be continuous. If representation were continuous (Real numbers, 
where each value represents a unique message), then noise would easily cause confusion of 
one message with another (message1 + noise = message2), no matter how large or small its 
magnitude (variance).  
 
We note that, from a computer engineering standpoint, true Real number computers 
(i.e. employing continuous representation) are not physically realizable, because there is an 
uncountable infinity of Real numbers. For example, the memory content of a modern 
digital computer can be concatenated in order to form a long but finite-length word; 
whereas true Real numbers have infinite precision (decimal places), and consequently, 
require infinite space to store even a single Real number (or variable) which violates the 
basic foundation of information storage. Therefore, from a computer engineering 
standpoint, a truly continuous computational device is not physically realizable. 
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Appendix 2: Quantization Step Sizes 
 
 
Table S1: The size of each step corresponding to the quantization precision. 
 
 
  
Precision 
(bit)
Number of steps 
(categories)
Size of each step 
(category)
Angle on a wheel 
(degrees)
1 21 = 2 0.5 180
2 22 = 4 0.25 90
3 23 = 8 0.125 45
4 24 = 16 0.0625 22.5
5 25 = 32 0.03125 11.25
6 26 = 64 0.015625 5.625
7 27 = 128 0.0078125 2.8125
8 28 = 256 0.00390625 1.40625
9 29 = 512 0.001953125 0.703125
10 210 = 1024 0.0009765625 0.3515625
20 220 = 1048576 9.53674 x 10-7 0.000343323
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Appendix 3: Experimental Conditions 
 
 
              
 
 
Figure S1: Experimental conditions. (A) The 12 conditions of experiment 1 (i.e. 2-wheel), 
with x ≥ z. (B) The 15 conditions of experiment 2 (i.e. 2-wheel), with x > z. (C) The 20 
conditions of experiment 3 (i.e. 3-wheel), with x > y > z.  
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Appendix 4: Nested Hypothesis Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S2: Nested hypothesis tests. (A) Models used in the 2-wheel task of experiments 1 
and 2. (B) Models used in the 3-wheel task of experiment 3. 
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Appendix 5: Results of Nested Hypothesis Tests  
 
 
Table S2: Results of nested hypothesis test 1 for experiment 1. There are 20 participants in 
total. 
 
 
Qk[x]Qk[z] Yes: linear Yes 1 5 0
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Table S3: Results of nested hypothesis test 2 for experiment 1. There are 20 participants in 
total. Nested hypothesis test 2 contains three additional 4-bit models. 
 
  
Q4[x]Q4[z] Yes: linear Yes: 4 bits 0 6 0
Qk[x]Qk[z] Yes: linear Yes 1 5 0
Qk[x]Qn[z] Yes: linear No 2 4 0
Q4[wa(x)]Q4[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 Yes: 4 bits 2 4 3
Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 Yes 3 3 3
Qk[wa(x)]Qn[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 No 4 2 0
Q4[wa(x)]Q4[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 Yes: 4 bits 4 2 11
Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 Yes 5 1 1
Qk[wa(x)]Qn[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 No 6 -
2 failed all 
tests
Degrees of 
freedom
No. of 
subjects 
passing nested 
test 2
Models
Homogeneous?       
(i.e. same distortion 
function for x and z)
Same 
precision for 
x and z?
No. of free 
parameters
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Table S4: Results of nested hypothesis test 2 for experiment 2. There are 16 participants in 
total. 
 	
Q4[x]Q4[z] Yes: linear Yes: 4 bits 0 6 0
Qk[x]Qk[z] Yes: linear Yes 1 5 0
Qk[x]Qn[z] Yes: linear No 2 4 0
Q4[wa(x)]Q4[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 Yes: 4 bits 2 4 5
Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 Yes 3 3 0
Qk[wa(x)]Qn[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 No 4 2 1
Q4[wa(x)]Q4[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 Yes: 4 bits 4 2 10
Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 Yes 5 1 0
Qk[wa(x)]Qn[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 No 6 - 0
Models
Homogeneous?       
(i.e. same distortion 
function for x and z)
Same 
precision for 
x and z?
No. of free 
parameters
Degrees of 
freedom
No. of 
subjects 
passing nested 
test
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Table S5: Results of nested hypothesis test 2 for experiment 3. There are 40 participants in 
total.  
Q4[x]Q4[y]Q4[z] Yes: linear Yes: 4 bits 0 9 1
Qk[x]Qk[y]Qk[z] Yes: linear Yes 1 8 0
Qk[x]Qm[y]Qn[z] Yes: linear No 3 6 0
Q4[wa(x)]Q4[wa(y)]Q4[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 Yes: 4 bits 2 7 10
Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wa(y)]Qk[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 Yes 3 6 3
Qk[wa(x)]Qm[wa(y)]Qn[wa(z)] Yes: Prelec-2 No 5 4 4
Q4[wa(x)]Q4[wb(y)]Q4[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 Yes: 4 bits 6 3 19
Qk[wa(x)]Qk[wb(y)]Qk[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 Yes 7 2 2
Qk[wa(x)]Qm[wb(y)]Qn[wc(z)] No: Prelec-2 No 9 -
1 failed all 
tests
No. of free 
parameters
Same 
precision for 
x, y and z?
Homogeneous?       
(i.e. same distortion 
function for x, y and z)
Models
Degrees 
of 
freedom
No. of 
subjects 
passing the 
nested test
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Appendix 6: Interpretations of Homogeneous and Non-Homogeneous 
Participants 
 
Mathematically, there is only one true answer to every conjunction probability. 
However, estimates of conjunctions are subjective, and vary among individuals. In our 
analysis, we used the quantized Prelec function to allow for these variations. Figure S3A 
shows the probability distortion curve of a typical homogeneous participant in experiment 
1. The dashed diagonal black line denotes the mathematical truth. Since both x and z are 
distorted similarly, there is only one distortion curve for each participant. Figure S3C 
shows the distortion curves for a typical non-homogeneous participant, where x and z are 
distorted differently. Therefore, there is one distortion curve for x and another for z; the 
curve for the “large” wheel (x) is plotted in red and the “small” wheel (z) in blue. Here, the 
same objective probability has more than one subjective truth within each individual. The 
significance is better illustrated in Figure S4. Consider a non-homogeneous participant 
from our experiment, presented with two separate cases of the 2-wheel task (Figure S4A). 
In both cases, a wheel with 0.42 probability is presented, but its magnitude is different 
relative to the other wheel. This participant’s probability distortion curves are shown in 
Figure S4B. The vertical dotted line shows where 0.42 is objectively. This participant 
processes 0.42 differently in each case, as depicted by the two horizontal arrows in red and 
blue. Not only does the truth lie in the mind of the beholder, there can be many shades of it 
internally. 
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Figure S3: The probability distortion curves of typical homogeneous and non-
homogeneous participants. (A, C) 2-wheel experiment 1. (B, D) 3-wheel experiment 3. (A) 
wa represents the quantized Prelec function for the 2 wheels (i.e. x and z); since this is a 
homogeneous participant, both wheels are distorted in the same manner, and therefore, 
there is only one common quantized Prelec function. (C) wa and wc represent the quantized 
Prelec functions for wheels x and z respectively. (B) wa represents the quantized Prelec 
function for the 3 wheels (i.e. x, y and z); since this is a homogeneous participant, all 3 
wheels are distorted in the same manner. (D) wa, wb and wc represent the quantized Prelec 
functions for wheels x, y and z respectively since this is a non-homogeneous participant. 
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Figure S4: An objective probability of 0.42 being treated differently depending on its 
relative magnitude to the other wheel(s). (A) Two separate cases of the 2-wheel task 
presented to the participant. (B) The corresponding distortion curves for the wheels x and 
z, with the 2 arrows showing different subjective probabilities corresponding to the 
objective probability of 0.42. 
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Appendix 7: Visual Intuition for Quantized Probability		
In order to illustrate the intuition for quantization, we hereby introduce two 
terminologies: No Noticeable Difference (NND) and Big Noticeable Difference (BND). 
The first signifies each flat region of the quantized probability distortion curve (any value 
falling along this flat region is treated indifferently), whereas the second signifies the 
abrupt step between two flat regions of the curve (the value just after the step is 
significantly different from the value just before the step). Figure S5A shows the quantized 
curve for a homogeneous participant from Experiment 3 (i.e. 3-wheel task). The 
experiment stimuli (i.e. wheels) are plotted as dots. Recall that a homogeneous participant 
distorts all the stimuli (i.e. wheels x, y and z) using the same quantized curve. The area 
highlighted by the dashed purple circle contains 3 dots (i.e. stimuli). The second and third 
dots fall along the flat region, and therefore, both are treated indifferently to one another 
(No Noticeable Difference). The first dot falls on the flat region that is one step below, and 
therefore, it is treated differently to the second and third dots (Big Noticeable Difference). 
Figure S5B shows the corresponding quantized curves and stimuli for a non-homogeneous 
participant from Experiment 1. In our quantized model, each rise in the graph is an abrupt 
step rise. We theorize that, in reality, each rise may actually be an S-shaped rise, one that is 
consistent with the theories of psychometric functions and the Just Noticeable Difference 
(JND) threshold from Weber’s law. Certainly, the very notion of JND implies the existence 
of NND and BND – meaning, the JND is plausibly sandwiched somewhere in between the 
NND and the BND. 
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Figure S5: Dashed purple circles illustrate the notions of No Noticeable Difference (NND) 
and Big Noticeable Difference (BND). The graphs are quantized probability distortion 
curves. The stimuli (i.e. wheels of the experiment) are plotted as dots. (A) A homogeneous 
participant from Experiment 3 (i.e. 3-wheel task). (B) A non-homogeneous participant 
from Experiment 1 (i.e. 2-wheel task). 		 	
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Appendix 8: Summary of All Model Parameters 
 
 
 
 
Figure S6: Summary of the model parameters of all participants. (A) Scatterplot of δ and γ 
parameters of the quantized probability distortion functions for all participants. There are 
no obvious clusters or patterns in the parameters values and distortion curves for all 
participants. (B) Histogram of the precision of all wheels across all participants. The 
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precision of all wheels across all participants range from 1 to 10 bits, with a mode of 4 
bits. While the locations of the quantized steps (as determined by γ and δ) vary from 
participant to participant, the number of quantized steps in each wheel is astonishingly 
similar (i.e. 4 bits = 16 steps), between participants, from wheel to wheel. 
(C) Distortion curves for all 2-wheel participants. (D) Distortion curves for all 3-wheel 
participants. 
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Appendix 9: A Novel Quantized (Discrete) Exponential Discounting 
Model 
 
Another commonly used discount function is the continuous exponential 
discounting model (Laibson, 1997; Chabris et al., 2008): 
 
 
 
where SV is the subjective value, A is the objective value, D is the time delay, and δ  is the 
discount rate with 	0<δ <1  . We note that in some literature (Green & Myerson, 2004), the 
exponential discounting model is expressed as: 
 
 
 
where b is the discount rate parameter. Figure S7 (left) shows an example of a 
conventional, continuous exponential discounting function. In our work here, we adopted 
the mathematically equivalent version (Laibson, 1997; Chabris et al., 2008), where: 
 
 
 
Similar to the hyperbolic case, we quantize (Gray & Neuhoff, 1998) this model to 
produce:  
 
 
 
SV
A = δ
D
SV
A = e
−bD
SV
A = e
−bD = e−b( )D = 1eb
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
D
= δ D
Qn
SV
A
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
=Qn δ D⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
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where 2n is the number of steps. Figure S7 (right) shows an example of a 3-bit quantized 
exponential discounting model (i.e. 3 bits = 23 = 8 levels). Similar to the case of a 
quantized hyperbolic model, the continuous exponential model is simply a quantized 
model with an infinite number of steps. 
 
 
Figure S7: Left) Conventional, continuous exponential discounting model. Right) 3-bit 
quantized exponential discounting model. 
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Appendix 10: Results for the Quantized Exponential Model 
 
We fit the same experimental data using the same maximum likelihood estimation 
method to the quantized exponential model. Figure S8 shows the negative log likelihood 
for a sample participant. Similar to the case of the quantized hyperbolic model, the 
precisions for the quantized exponential model here range from 1 to 16 bits. The fit for the 
continuous exponential model is shown in the horizontal dashed red line. As the precision 
of the quantized exponential model (i.e. blue line) increases from 1 to 5 bits, the fit 
improves (i.e. value of negative log likelihood decreases). Beyond that, the fit becomes 
worse (value of negative log likelihood increases) and subsequently flattens off at the level 
of the continuous model. The best fit occurs at a precision of 5 bits, suggesting that a 
quantized model may be a better fit than a continuous one, similar to that observed in the 
hyperbolic case. 
 
 
Figure S8: Negative log likelihood of exponential model fit for one sample participant. 
 
 
We found that 8 out of 20 participants were best fit to 5-bit quantized exponential 
models (i.e. 25 = 32 steps). The histograms of fitted parameters are shown in Figure S9.  
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Figure S9: Histogram of fitted parameters (20 participants) for the quantized exponential 
model. 
 
 
As was the case for the quantized hyperbolic model, we applied a nested hypothesis test to 
explore whether the second parameter is statistically justifiable or required for the data 
fitting of each participant: 
 
 
The quantized exponential model on the left has 2 free parameters (i.e. n and δ ), whereas 
the model on the right has only 1 free parameter (i.e. δ ) with n being fixed at 5 bits 
(instead of being a second free parameter). The results from the nested hypothesis test 
showed that 15 out of 20 participants were best fit to this 1-paramater model (i.e. δ  is a 
free parameter while n is fixed at 5 bits). The 5-bit quantized exponential discounting 
curves for two representative participants are shown in Figure S10.  
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Figure S10: 5-bit quantized exponential discounting curves for two representative 
participants. 
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Appendix 11: Comparing the Quantized Hyperbolic and Quantized 
Exponential Models 
 
We took the best fit quantized hyperbolic models (i.e. after the nested hypothesis 
test) and compared it with the best fit quantized exponential models (after the nested 
hypothesis test) using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) (see Busemeyer & Diederich (2014) for an overview of AIC 
and BIC). These comparisons are plotted in Figure S11 and Figure S12 respectively. Note 
that, for both the AIC and BIC comparisons, a smaller value represents a better fit. Both 
AIC and BIC results are in agreement: 13 out of 20 participants were best fit to the 
quantized exponential model, with the remaining 7 participants best fit to the quantized 
hyperbolic model.  
 
 
Figure S11: Comparison using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
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Figure S12: Comparison using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
 
 
Following this best-of-the-best AIC/BIC comparison, 15 out of 20 participants have 5-bit 
precision (see Figure S13). 
 
 
Figure S13: Histogram of the 20 participants’ precisions after the best-of-the-best 
AIC/BIC comparison.   
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A comparison of the quantized exponential and quantized hyperbolic curves of 2 
representative participants is shown in Figure S14. 
 
 
Figure S14: Comparing the quantized exponential and quantized hyperbolic curves of 2 
representative participants. 
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